By and large, in De interpretatione Aristotle is concerned with our capability to speak about all that presents itself to our mind. From chapter 4 onwards, he deals with the statement-making expressions (affirmation and negation), which are the main tools for conveying our thoughts about things. This discussion is prepared (chapters 1-3) by some important observations concerning the basic elements of such expressions, viz. OVOJ.1<X and pflJla. The present contribution contains some comments on Aristotle's view of the proper nature of statement-making as put forward in De interpretatione.I First, I would like to highlight Aristotle's, what Sir David Ross has called2 'frankly 'representative' view of knowledge' by discussing the terms OJ.1otroJ.1a and npuyJ.1a. Next, I will discuss what is meant by a term's 'time-connotation', and finally I will examine the semantics of oVOJl<X, pflJla and A.Oyo~.
Meaning and Representation: lVhat does OJ.lOlOOJ.la refer to?
In the opening chapter, Aristotle's attention is focussed on the representative character of expressions and thoughts, respectively: 'Spoken utterances are symbols of 'affections in the soul' (i.e. thoughts), and written marks symbols of spoken utterances' (16a3-4), [ ... ] what these (sc. expressions) are in the first place signs ofaffections of the soul-are the same for all people; and what these affections are 'likenesses' of-things-are surely the same' (16a6-* Twenty years ago Jaap Mansfeld and I worked together on the Festschrift for our common teacher and his predecessor in the chair of Ancient and Patristic philosophy at Utrecht. It now gives me great pleasure to be able to contribute this little offering to his Festschrift, on the occasion of his 60th birthday.
1 The present author has greatly profited from the rich literature on the subject, especially the pioneering work by John Ackrill (1963), E. Montanari's (1988) extensive commentary on De int., chs 1-4, and the exemplary work by Hermann Weidemann (1994). 8). The author is not interested in the psychological aspects of making utterances, which aspects he regards (16a8-9) as 'not belonging to the present subject', but to 'the work on the soul' (i.e. De anima III 3-8).
The pivotal notion of OJ.Loico~ou:x ('likeness') has already drawn the attention of the Ancient Greek commentators of De interpretatione. 3 The English word 'likeness', however, does not cover the entire semantic area of Greek OJ!Ot<OJ.La. In addition to the basic sense of 'likeness', 'image', 'replica', the Greek word as used by e.g. Plato and Aristotle connotes the idea of 'being substitutable for' or 'representative of the object the thing called OJ!Ot<OJ.La is said to be the likeness of, to the effect that an object's nature may be designated and clarified by its OJ!Ot<OJ.La. In order to illustrate this wider meaning I shall give some significant passages from Aristotle.
In Nicomachean Ethics VIII 10, 1160b21ff. Aristotle claims that there are resemblances between different types of political constitutions and the relationships between the members of a household; e.g. the relation between a father and his sons corresponds with a monarchy, whereas that between man and wife may stand for the aristocratic constitution, and so on for timocracy and democracy. The general idea is that the different types of household may elucidate the different natures of their respective counterparts in politics. This discussion is introduced as follows: 'One may find resemblances (OJ.LOtcOJ.La'ta) to the constitutions, and, as it were, patterns (7tapao£iyJ.La'ta) of them even in households (1160b21-2).'
In Politics VIII 5, in which the nature of musical expression is discussed, it is argued (1340a16-8) that 'there is clearly nothing which we are so much concerned to acquire and to cultivate as the power of forming right judgements, and of taking delight in good dispositions and noble actions.' 4 With regard to the role of musical expression, Aristotle points out that qua representations (OJ.LOtcOJ.La'ta) of anger, gentleness, courage and all other kinds of qualities of character, rhythm and melody are practically equivalent in their effects on our souls to the affections they represent. We know from our own experience, he argues (a23-5), that the propensity of
